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 ABSTRACT:  When longstanding marketing quota systems were eliminated (“bought out”) in 2002 
for peanuts and 2004 for tobacco, producers lost quota-related price supports and other quota system 
protections, and were exposed more directly to a market-oriented system.  The nature of the peanut and 
tobacco marketing quota programs, the structure and magnitude of the buyouts, and market dynamics 
influenced the ensuing structural changes that occurred at the farm, regional, and aggregate market 
levels.  Analysis of USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Surveys (ARMS) on peanut and 
tobacco producers over a multi-year timeframe provides insights on, and a basis for comparing and 
contrasting the buyout impacts along multiple dimensions.  Notable developments include a 
consolidation in the number and increased scale of farms, regional shifts in production regions, and 




Until recently, peanuts and tobacco were among a small group of U.S. commodities regulated by 
marketing quotas. Similar to the sugar and dairy programs still in effect, the peanut and tobacco 
marketing quota programs were established during the 1930s to support and stabilize growers’ 
incomes.  Although the programs provided dependable short-term expectations about prices and 
output, they tempered growers’ ability to adapt to longer term market forces by hindering economies of 
scale, restricting production location, and distorting trade. The 2002 Farm Act and the Fair and 
Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 ended the price support programs and brought about structural 
change in the peanut and tobacco leaf industries. 
 
The elimination of the marketing quotas is commonly referred to as “buyouts” because quota owners—
those with the right to sell the commodity at a regulated support price—were financially compensated 
for the loss of an asset (quota ownership). Peanut quota owners received buyout payments of around 
$1.3 billion over 5 years, funded by the Federal Government, whereas tobacco quota owners and active 
producers receive a total of $9.6 billion over 10 years from assessments on tobacco product 
manufacturers and importers. Peanut farmers became eligible for the same type of commodity support 
programs—marketing loans, direct payments, and countercyclical payments—available to producers of 
other grains and oilseeds, while tobacco producers did not. 
 
The buyouts were enacted in response to many economic factors that were primarily linked to global 
competition. For peanuts, lower priced imports had made inroads in the domestic market as a result of 
trade treaties, and producers potentially faced eventual reductions to their quota allocations or lower 
support prices. U.S. tobacco producers contended with global competition from lower cost foreign 
producers, which led to falling global demand for U.S. tobacco cigarettes and leaf and an increased 
share of foreign leaf in U.S. cigarette production. The reduced demand resulted in lower annual 
marketing quota levels.  
 
The threat of lower demand for domestically sourced peanuts and tobacco, along with high production 
costs, made longterm operation of the programs as “no net cost” (i.e., self-paying, without Government 
expenditures) less viable.  In addition, acquiring quota rights raised costs and made it difficult for 
efficient operators to expand, and restrictions on the transfer of quota between regions prevented new 
operators from entering the market.  In terminating the quota and price support programs, the buyouts 
also eliminated geographical restrictions on production. 
 Quota Buyout Provisions 
 
The marketing quota programs for peanuts and tobacco operated under three main Principles – quotas 
that limited the quantity that could be marketed, government operated loan rates that provided a floor 
on per-unit revenue, and geographical restrictions on production.  After evaluating demand conditions, 
USDA annually established a national quota level for each crop, and distributed the marketing rights to 
quota owners in different regions based of their historical share of quota ownership.  The quota level 
was designed to ensure that the market-clearing price would exceed or match the established support 
price (loan rate).  Quota allocations were originally based on acreage, but gradually turned into 
quantitative limits to keep yield variations from over- or under-supplying the market.  However, 
restrictions remained on the sale or lease of quota rights to farmers across county or State lines.   
 
When competitive pressures led to the reduction of support prices for peanuts (figure 1), and to 
significant reductions to the quota levels for tobacco (figure 2), separate pieces of legislation were 
enacted in 2002 and 2004 to terminate the quota programs and provide compensation to quota owners 
for the loss of value to the quota—an asset which provided a rental income stream to those who leased 
out quota, and ensured higher than free market prices to those who owned and/or produced and 
marketed quota peanuts and tobacco (Dohlman, Foreman, and Da Pra, 2009).  
 




















(cents/pound) Quota Support Price
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA's Farm Service Agency.
Note: The Quota level refers to the national poundage quota before adjustments.  Year refers to marketing year (August-






























Support price ($/lb) burley quota flue quota
Burley tobacco support price
Flue-cured tobacco support price
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA's Farm Service Agency.




Although the peanut and tobacco buyout programs were similar in intent, they contrasted notably in 
their structure, financial size, and Government support. These differences were most evident in the 
total size of payments, the method of dispersing payments to quota owners and/or farmers, and the 
source of funds for the buyout payments.  The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 
eliminated tobacco quotas and price supports effective in 2005, and provided $9.6 billion over 10 years 
for buyout and transition payments.  The tobacco buyout payments were distributed between quota 
owners (receiving $7 per pound of quota owned) and producers ($3 per pound).  The 2002 Farm Act 
included $1.3 billion in buyout payments to peanut quota owners, with quota owners receiving a total 
of $0.55 per pound of owned quota.  Tobacco growers received no further government support, but 
peanut growers became eligible for direct and countercyclical payments on newly established peanut 
base acres, and for a marketing loan program that provides a price guarantee of about 60 percent of 
what was available under the quota program.
1  Peanut buyout payments (and the new forms of 
Government assistance) were funded by the Federal Government, while tobacco payments were 
funded from assessments on tobacco product manufacturers and importers. 
                                                 
1 Base acres are the peanut acres eligible for some Government commodity programs. For more information on 
peanut program and other commodity provisions of the 2002 Farm Act and revisions enacted in the 2008 Farm 
Act, see the Title I provisions in: “The 2008 Farm Bill Side-By-Side Comparison,” 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/FarmBill/2008/. Definitions of specific farm policy terms can be found at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/glossary.htm.  
Farm level impacts: Farm numbers shrank but remaining farms grew in scale 
 
Before the buyouts, peanut and tobacco producers were not immune from market forces, but changes 
in demand were filtered by the Government and market adjustments were somewhat rigid, with the 
government readjusting quotas and/or support prices on an annual or even less frequent basis (peanut 
loan rates were set for the duration of the 1996 Farm Act).  The marketing quota systems also kept 
prices artificially high, which undermined the competitiveness of U.S. producers relative to foreign 
competition and reduced incentives to lower costs and improve efficiency.  One drag on productivity 
was the fragmented nature of quota ownership.  In the years preceding the buyouts, the number of 
quota owners far exceeded the number of active peanut or tobacco producers, since retired farmers 
typically retained their quota and rented it out to others.  In 2002, approximately 75,000 people owned 
some peanut quota, compared with 8,000 farms growing peanuts.  There were more than 350,000 
tobacco quota owners in 2004, but only 57,000 tobacco farms (some of which produced tobacco in 
States that did not participate in the Federal quota program, such as Maryland).   
 
Most peanut and tobacco farmers owned some quota, but about 60 percent of quota production for 
each crop was from rented quota.  Consequently, producers wanting to maintain or expand the scale of 
their operations had to rent quota rights from quota owners, which added to their cash expenses and 
management time.  The difficulty and expense of acquiring quota rights likely kept the scale of 
operations smaller than optimal, and may have discouraged investments in specialized equipment or 
management practices that were economically justified only if used over a larger area.   
 
Although the annual USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data does not link 
data from the same farms between years, and does not track the characteristics of farms that exited a 
particular farm enterprise (e.g., peanut or tobacco production), it does estimate farm numbers and 
allows comparison of the characteristics of average peanut and tobacco farms surveyed between years.  
Drawing upon surveys from the years the buyouts were enacted and ensuing years, the ARMS data 
does suggest that the buyouts contributed to accelerated growth in the scale of peanut and tobacco 
farms and that exits among the smaller scale producers, at least initially, was responsible for the 
increase in  average peanut and tobacco acreage, and total operated acres, per farm.   
 
The ARMS data indicate that the number of farmers producing burley and flue-cured tobacco fell by 
nearly 60 percent between 2004 and 2005, followed by a continued, but slower reduction in the 
number of farms.
2  By 2007, the number of flue-cured and burley tobacco farms fell to about 15,500, 
compared with just over 50,000 in 2004 (figure 3).  The number of peanut farms declined less rapidly, 
but fell from about 8,000 to roughly 5,000 between 2002 and 2007.  During the same time periods, 
average peanut acres per farm grew from 137 acres in 2002 to 227 acres in 2007, while total average 
operated acres per farm expanded from 907 acres to 1,525 acres.  Similarly, flue-cured tobacco acreage 
per farm grew from 33 acres to 84 acres between 2004 and 2007, and burley tobacco acreage rose from 
5 acres to 11 acres.  Total operated acres rose from 566 acres to 906 acres for flue-cured farms, and 
from 191 acres to 247 acres for burley farms. 
 
                                                 
2 Flue-cured and burley tobacco were the two main types of tobacco that fell within the marketing quota program.  These 
types accounted for over 90 percent of U.S. production. Figure 3: After the buyouts, farm numbers 

















Flue-cured farms Burley farms Peanut farms
Flue-cured acreage Burley acreage Peanut acreage
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Surveys (ARMS), USDA, 2002-2007.
 
 
With peanut prices declining 30 percent and tobacco prices falling 20 percent immediately after the 
buyouts, the primary consideration for producer exit, entry, or size of operation decisions was whether 
the crop enterprise could be profitable in a new lower-priced and more volatile environment.  The 
buyout payments provided some financial flexibility to quota owners who produced their own quota, 
but they had to weigh whether new or continuing investments would outweigh the risks.
3  Many quota 
owners may have had a cost structure that was not viable at prices below the quota loan rates available 
under the quota system, and decided to exit.
4   
 
In contrast, producers who relied primarily on rented quota may have been sufficiently competitive to 
remain in operation, or even to expand, because they had been viable producers even with the 
additional expenses incurred from quota rental fees.  The termination of quotas eliminated these costs.  
Based on changes in the location of production—discussed further in the next section—it appears that 
the entry of new farms was a more significant factor behind the change in size and other characteristics 
of peanut farms than for tobacco.  
 
In addition to the reduced number and increased scale of peanut and tobacco farms, the ARMS data 
reveal that remaining farms in 2007 were in as good, or better financial condition, were more 
diversified, and made greater use of contracts as a price hedge than the average farm during the year of 
the buyouts.  Total farm and off-farm household income, total farm business net worth, and the 
percentage of farms falling into the higher sales class were all comparable or higher in 2007 than in 
                                                 
3 Data from the 2008 Tobacco ARMS indicates that, of tobacco producers who remained in operation, about 40 percent of 
their buyout payments (which averaged a total of about $135,000 per recipient) were devoted to investments in farm 
equipment or land to raise tobacco. 
4 Combined data from the 2004 and 2005 ARMS indicates that 41 percent of burley tobacco farmers quit farming entirely 
the year after the buyout, while 15 percent continued to farm other crops and 44 percent continued to grow burley.  Among 
flue-cured tobacco farmers, 27 percent quit farming, 36 percent continued to grow other crops, and 37 percent continued 
growing flue-cured tobacco. 2002 for peanuts and in 2004 for tobacco (Table 1, see Appendix tables for more detailed data).  Wh
data are not conclusive and are highly variable from year to year, total household incomes increased 
for the sample of peanut and tobacco farms surveyed by ARMS, with increases coming mostly from 
farm activities rather than off-farm income.  This is consistent with the observation that operators of 
larger farms tend to devote most of their time to farming activities and rely less on off-farm work to 
supplement incomes.  While the debt-asset ratio declined significantly only for peanut farms, total far
business net worth and the share of farms operating in the largest sales class of $500,000 annually rose 




Table 1: Characteristics of peanut and tobacco farms changed rapidly after the quota buyouts
               Item 2002 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Number of farms 8,086      5,134      11,062    2,639      39,215  12,973    
Farm size (acres per farm):
  Total operated  907         1,525      566        906         191        247         
  Peanut 137         227         NA NA NA NA
  Tobacco NA NA 33          84          5           11           
Sales totaling $500,000 or more (percent of farms )1 4          33           12          31          NA NA
Percent of farms with peanut marketing contracts 40          65           NA NA NA NA
Percent of farms with tobacco marketing contracts NA NA 47          83          31          49           
Household income per farm (1,000 dollars )7 7          111         105        140         54          60           
  Farm income per farm 21          65           66          110         10          9            
  Off-farm income per farm 55          46           39          30          43          51           
Farm assets per farm (1,000 dollars )9 3 8         2,129      928        1,575      465        651         
Farm debt per farm (1,000 dollars) 162         185         88          138         37          43           
Farm business net worth per farm (1,000 dollars )7 7 6         1,944      840        1,437      428        608         
Debt/asset ratio (percent )1 7          9             9            9            8           7            
Number of commodities per farm 3.7 4.9 3.3 4.6 2.8 4.1
Source:  USDA, Economic Research Service using data from ERS and National Agricultural Statistics Service.
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2002, 2004, and 2007. 
NA = Not applicable.
Peanuts Flue-cured tobacco Burley tobacco
 
Tobacco and peanut producers approached their risk management strategies similarly following the 
d other 
 
Some tobacco and peanut producers used contracts prior to the buyouts. Tobacco contracts sometimes 
buyouts—by increasing their use of marketing contracts to lock in prices and by maintaining a 
diversified commodity mix to spread risk. The use of contracts to set terms on prices, output, an
conditions has been a growing trend throughout agriculture, but contracts were not widely used for 
peanuts and tobacco until the 2000s because the marketing quota system and other institutions (e.g.,
tobacco auctions and farmer cooperatives) served a similar purpose.  
offered higher prices than auctions. Peanut producers growing nonquota peanuts for export or crushing—about one-quarter of production—relied mostly on marketing contracts.
5 Nevertheless, the 
percentage of farms using marketing contracts increased significantly following the buyouts. By 2007, 
65 percent of peanut farms used marketing contracts, compared with 40 percent in 2002. 
Less than 10 percent of tobacco farms used tobacco marketing contracts in 2000, but this percentage 
rose in the years leading up to the tobacco buyout. By 2007, 83 percent of flue-cured tobacco farms 
and 49 percent of burley tobacco farms used tobacco marketing contracts. Data from the recent 2008 
Tobacco ARMS indicates that 93 percent of tobacco farms used marketing contracts with tobacco 
companies to market their tobacco.  The same survey indicates that marketing options have declined 
for tobacco producers since 2004, with the mean number of marketing options declining from 4.1 in 
2004 to 2.6 in 2008.  Since peanut and tobacco farms are larger following the buyouts, they also tend 
to be more diversified in their commodity mix and better able to spread risk. 
Regional Shifts in Production 
 
In addition to the declining number and changing characteristics of the average peanut and tobacco 
farm measured by the ARMS data, county-level and crop reporting district acreage data collected by 
USDA shows that changes in the regional location of production has been another significant departure 
from the pre-buyout period.  With the elimination of marketing quotas, geographic restrictions ended, 
resulting in significant shifts in production area between counties and States as some traditional 
production regions declined and others expanded.  Lower, post-buyout prices no longer supported 
profitable production in high cost areas.  This trend was most notable for peanuts, where production 
migrated away from the Southwest and Mid-Atlantic but remained strong in the Southeast (figure 4).  
Many counties in the Southeast saw increased plantings, and production spread to some Southeastern 
counties with no significant production history.  As a result, the Southeast’s share of national peanut 
acreage grew from about half before the buyout to nearly three-quarters. 
 
Tobacco production did not increase substantially in any production location, but it did become more 
concentrated in parts of the two largest tobacco-producing States—North Carolina for flue-cured 
tobacco and Kentucky for burley tobacco (Figure 5).  Burley acreage remained strongest in central and 




                                                 
5 Peanut producers were permitted to produce and market non-quota peanuts (so-called “additionals”) if they 
were destined for non-food uses, such as crushing, or were exported.  States such as New Mexico (64.5%), 
Texas (62.5%), and Florida (57.9%) produced a majority of their peanuts outside of the quota system in the 3 






Drawing on the analysis of Brown, Rucker, and Thurman (2007), the intuition behind the observed 
shifts in production regions can be illustrated with a simple two-county model, one representing a high 
cost region and the other a low cost region.  Although the first county has higher marginal costs of 
production, marginal costs do not equilibrate across counties because quota could not (or was difficult) 
to transfer between counties.  In practice, quota rental rates may also have been lower in the high cost 
counties, reducing the difference in marginal costs.   
 
Under the marketing quota system, the price and quota allocated to each county is represented by P0 
and Q0, respectively.  Each county produces its allocated quota and sells the crop at the quota support 
price.  When the quotas are removed, the equilibrium price declines to a price of P1, based on 
aggregate demand and the combined marginal cost curves of each county (not depicted).  As quota 
restriction were removed, production declines in the high cost county, and increases in the low cost 
county, resulting in overall gains to consumer surplus (assuming an unchanged demand curve), 
producer surplus losses County 1, producer surplus gains in County 2, and a more efficient reallocation 




                                                 
6 Changes in producer surplus are abstracted from the impacts on quota owners, who unambiguously are worse 
off.  For the purposes of this illustration, one can assume that all the quota is rented.  The outcomes are depicted 
in more detail, and somewhat differently, in Brown, Rucker, and Thurman (2007), pp. 640-641. mc 
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Q0  Q1 
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The impacts of greater planting flexibility and market orientation, and the regional shifts in production, 
appear to have contributed to increased efficiency and improved yields, particularly for peanuts. Since 
the buyout, areas with a history of stronger yields have been gaining acreage at the expense of areas 
with poorer yields, and national peanut yields averaged 17 percent higher during 2003-08 than during 
1996-2002. This could be the result of better growing conditions in the new areas, and perhaps 
different crop management practices employed by the larger operations, such as longer crop rotations 
and better use of inputs. Tobacco yields have shown little if any discernible upward trend since the 
tobacco buyout, but ARMS data indicate that areas that have retained the most acreage historically 
have higher and less variable yields than those that have lost acreage. 
Aggregate Market Developments 
The peanut and tobacco buyouts marked the beginning of a major transition for producers and other 
stakeholders in the marketing quota system. Producers faced lower prices, more risk, and pressures to 
contain costs and improve productivity. Prices initially declined—30 percent for peanuts and 20 
percent for tobacco—and production immediately fell. At the same time, the buyouts forced 
restructuring in both sectors that left producers better poised to respond to and take advantage of 
market opportunities. Several years after the buyouts, total acreage and prices remain below pre-
buyout levels, but more efficient production and competitive prices have established some of the 
conditions for demand growth, particularly in export markets.  
Peanut acreage has been somewhat volatile, but higher yields have boosted production—including a 
record crop in 2008—and domestic demand is stronger than before the buyout (Figure 7). U.S. peanuts 
have also become more competitive both in the domestic market and abroad. Before the buyout, U.S. peanut imports had been on a steady upward path due to market access agreements that were part of 
the 1994 NAFTA and WTO treaties. However, lower post-buyout prices caused imports to taper off. 
Lower prices reinforced by a generally weaker dollar since 2002 reversed the decline in peanut exports 
that preceded the buyout, and exports reached a 13-year high in 2008.  























Peanut buyout, May 2002
Sources:  USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service Crop Production, Quickstats,
 and Peanut Stocks and Processing; and Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note: Net exports refers to exports minus imports.  Domestic use refers to food use.  Years are marketing years (August-July).
 
Tobacco export demand also has gained momentum with a weakened dollar and a narrowing of the 
traditionally large gap between U.S. and foreign tobacco leaf prices. However, domestic demand for 
U.S. tobacco leaf continues to drop, but more slowly than prior to the tobacco buyout (Figure 8). The 
continued drop reflects the ongoing decline in domestic per capita smoking rates, relatively steady 
tobacco leaf imports, and reduced exports of U.S. cigarettes. Even with lower U.S. tobacco leaf prices, 
domestic demand has been constrained by high retail cigarette prices that largely reflect costs other 
than tobacco leaf (e.g., manufacturing, promotion, and taxes). Only in some specialized categories—
such as dark tobacco used in snuff and smokeless tobacco—has increased demand led to higher 





















Tobacco buyout (effective 
beginning in 2005)
Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service Crop Production and 
Quickstats; and Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. Factors for converting tobacco stocks to farm weight takes 
from USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service Tobacco Quarterly Stock Report, various years. 
Note: Net Exports refers to exports minus imports.  Prices are a simple average of flue-cured and burley tobacco prices.
Years are marketing years (July-June for flue-cured and October-September for burley).
 
Conclusion 
Although not all recent changes in the peanut and tobacco sectors can be attributed to the buyouts, they 
clearly represented landmark events that influenced many of the structural changes that followed. 
Decisions on whether to increase, continue, reduce, or drop out of production—or even to begin 
production for the first time—are now based more on market-determined net returns from alternative 
crop choices, and are no longer affected by geographic restrictions on production. Regional production 
shifts, farm consolidation, and increased exports suggest that the buyouts and planting flexibility have 
enhanced overall economic efficiency and responsiveness to market developments.  References: 
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Appendix table 1—Characteristics of peanut farms, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 
                 Item                                                              2001 (A)                    2002 (B)               2004 (C)                2006 (D)                   2007 
(E)         
 Farm size (acres per farm): 
  Operated  *860  907 E *894  E 1,054  1,525  BC 
  Owned  *356  398 
a437 524  *726 
  
Peanut acreage and yield: 
  Harvested (average peanut acres per farm) *120  E 137  E 156  E 182  E 227  ABCD 
  Yield (pounds per acre) 2,605  2,352  CDE 3,022  B 2,980  B 3,148  B 
  
Percent of peanut production value 
under marketing contracts 
a24 CDE 38  CDE 81  ABDE 63  ABC 57  ABC 
  
Other crop acreage (average per farm): 
   Cotton  *161 DE 231  193  DE 308  AC 300  AC 
   Corn for grain  *76  38 E 53  E 50  E *158  BCD 
   Soybeans  *26 DE 41  E 43  E 54  A *94  ABC 
   Wheat  *19 E *48  *24 23  *86  A 
   Tobacco 
a2 BE *6  A 
a7 *4 *7  A 
  
Production specialty
1 (percent of farms): 
   Peanut  *53 E 41  DE 41  E 27  B *18  ABC 
   Cotton 
a24 *12  D *14  D 35  BCE *19  D 
   General crop 
a9 CE *25 26  A 18  E 32  AD 
   Tobacco 
a4 
a9 
a8 *2 *2 






Sales class (percent of farms): 
   $500,000 or more  *8 
a14  15 22 33 
   $250,000-$499,999  *12  *15  *27  26  26 
   $100,000-$249,999  *38  *20  *20  20  16 
   $40,000-$99,999 
a22 *29  *24  14  *17 
   $39,999 or less 




2 (percent of farms): 
   Mid-Atlantic 
a24  19  10 10 13 
   Southeast  *45  67  69  84  75 
   Southwest 
a30 *11  *20 
a6 *12 
1 The production specialty refers to the commodity that accounted for 50 percent or more of the farm’s value of production.  General crop 
farms did not have a single commodity that met this criterion.  
2 The Mid-Atlantic region consists of Virginia and northeastern counties in North Carolina.  The Southeast region includes the  
southeastern counties in North Carolina and all of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.  The Southwest region 
includes Texas and Oklahoma.   
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate)x100.  * indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.   
a indicates that CV is above 50. 
Letters A, B, C, D, and E indicate significant column difference tests based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher. 
Rounded percents may not add precisely to 100.  
Source:  2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey.  
Appendix table 2 – Characteristics of peanut farms after the peanut buyout for selected years 
Item  2002  (A) 2004  (B) 2006  (C) 2007  (D) 
  
Number of peanut farms  8,086 D 8,608  D 6,386  D 5,134  ABC 
   Percent with a peanut marketing/production 
   contract  40 BCD 79  AC 55  AB 65  A 
 
Peanuts as percent of value of production  28  32  25  28 
 
Peanut acres per farm  137 D 156  D 182  D 227  ABC 
  
Operated acres per farm  907 D *894  D 1,054  1,525  AB 
  Owned and operated  *387 
a423 497  *707 
  Rented  520D 427  D 556  D 816  ABC 
  Cropland acres  676 D 606  D 798  D 1,050  ABC 
  
Operator occupation (percent): 
   Farming  85  79  82  87 
   Nonfarm 
a7 14  C 
a2 BD *13  C 
   Retired 
a8 *7  CD 0  B 0  B 
  
Operator age (mean) 50  53  55  A 54 
   Less than 50 years (percent) 52  CD 40  32  A 29  A 
   65 or more (percent) 24  *20  19  *18 
  
Operator education (percent): 
   Completed high school  90  87 D 95  97  B 
   Completed college  *19  *24  25  28 
  
Farm organization (percent): 
   Sole/family proprietor  80  86 A 82  A 84  A 
   Partnership  *12 
a8 9  12 
   Family corporation 
a5 5  C *1  BD *5  C 
  
Number of commodities per farm  3.7 D 3.5  D 3.4  D 4.9  ABC  
Number of farms raising: 
   Corn  38 D 41  D 32  D 59  ABC 
   Hay  *32  27  25  33 
   Cotton  57  55  61  62 
   Soybeans  23  21 D 22  31  B 
   Cattle  42  44  36  38 
 
Household income/farm family (dollars) 76,643 *109,938  117,878  *110,912 
   Farm income/farm family 
a21,264 BC *74,224  A 62,088  A *65,427 
   Off-farm income/farm family  55,380 B 35,714  A *55,790  45,485 
  
Average value in dollars per farm: 
   Farm assets  *937,706 CD *1,173,570  1,673,032  A 2,128,666  A 
   Farm debt  *162,009  *140,065  133,057  184,620 
   Farm business net worth  *775,697 CD *1,033,505  1,539,976  A 1,944,046  A 
Business debt/asset ratio  17 CD *12  8  A 9  A 
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate)x100.  * indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.   a indicates 
that CV is above 50. 
Letters A, B, C, and D indicate significant column differences based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher. 
Source:  2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey  
Appendix table 3 – Comparison of burley tobacco farms before and after tobacco buyout
1 
Item 2004  (A) 2005  (B) 2006  (C) 2007(D)  
 Number of tobacco farms  39,215 BCD 19,233  A 13,443  A *12,973  A 
   Percent with a tobacco marketing/production 
   contract  31 BC 78  AD 71A 49  B 
Tobacco as percent of value of production  43 
a21 33 39 
  
Operated acres per farm  191 C 215  328  A 247 
    Owned and operated  116 CD 138  169  A  190 A
 
    Rented  *70  *56 C *136  BD 
a44 C 
Cropland acres operated  106 C *133  215  A 124 
 
Tobacco acres per farm  5.0 C *6.3  10.1  A *10.5 
 
Percent of total labor expenses: 
   Operator and unpaid labor
2  84 BC 69  A 59 A   79 
  
Operator occupation (percent): 
   Farming  41  *50  42 A *34 
   Retired  *18 CD 
a16 CD 0  AB 0  AB 
 
Operator age (mean) 57  CD 55  49  A 50  A 
   Less than 50 years (percent) 37  46  *37  47 




Operator education (percent): 
   Completed high school  68 CD 84  97  A 88   
   Completed college 
a9 B 0  AC  *6 B 
a7 
 
Farm organization (percent): 
   Sole/family proprietor  92  97  95  86 





Number of commodities per farm  2.8 D 2.3  D 2.8  D 4.1  ABC 
   Percent of farms with one  *12 BD *32  AD 
a16 0  AB 
   Percent of farms with two  27  33 
a29 *19 
   Percent of farms with three  42 B *18  A 
a38 *39 
   Percent of farms with four or more  18  17  13  41 
 
Percent of farms raising: 
   Corn  *16  *18  *17  *26 
   Hay  73  57  78  73 
   Soybeans  *4 C *9  *13  A 
a8 
   Cattle  59  *35  *52  *43 
 
Household income/farm family (dollars) 53,597  54,495  80,436  60,175 
   Farm income/farm family  *10,414 C *20,022  C 47,414  ABD 
a 8,741 C 
   Off-farm income/farm family  43,183  34,474 D 33,022  D 51,434  BC 
 
Average value in dollars per farm: 
   Farm assets  465,056 C 557,464  802,981  A 651,486 
   Farm debt  37,068  *19,488 C *79,395  B 
a43,254 
   Farm business net worth  427,988 CD 537,976  723,586  A 608,233   
Business debt/asset ratio  8 B *3  AC *10  B 
a7 
1 Tobacco quotas and price supports ended after 2004 when the tobacco buyout program began.  Table includes all farms raising tobacco 
in the traditional burley tobacco production region. Most of these farms raise only burley tobacco, but some may also raise dark or flue-
cured tobacco. 
2An imputed wage rate is used to value unpaid labor hours.   
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate)x100.  * indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.   a indicates 
that CV is above 50. 
Letters A, B, C, and D indicate significant column differences based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher.  Source:  2004–07 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey.   
 
Appendix table 4—Comparison of flue-cured tobacco farms before and after tobacco buyout
1 
Item   2004 (A)  2005 (B) 2006  (C) 2007  (D) 
Number of tobacco farms  11,062 BCD 3,766  A 3,469  A   *2,639 A 
  Percent with tobacco marketing/production  
  contract  34 BCD 88  A 74 A   85 A
  
Tobacco as percent of value of production  45  37  47  47 
 
  Operated acres per farm  566 D 690  662  906  A 
    Owned and operated  *275  222  218  272 
    Rented  275 BD 456  A 428    615  A 
  Cropland acres operated  355 BD 547  A 489    694  A 
 
Flue-cured tobacco acres per farm  32.6 CD 46.9  D 59.1  AD 84.2  ABC 
 
Percent of total labor expenses: 
  Operator and unpaid labor
2  50 CD 43  D 35  AD  28 ABC 
 
Operator occupation (percent): 
   Farming  81 C 92  97  A 94 




   Retired 
a8 CD 
a6 0  A 0  A 
 
Operator age (mean) 54  53  53  52 
   Less than 50 years (percent) *33  34  *25  38 
   65 or more (percent) *14  *17  *9 
a16 
 
Operator education (percent): 
   Completed high school  83 D 86  D 93  95  AB 
   Completed college  *11 B 0  ACD *21  B *16  B 
 
Farm organization (percent): 
   Sole/family proprietor  89   81   85   82C 
   Partnership  *7   *15   *5  
a 9 
   Family corporation  *4 BC 
a1 AD 
a1 AD   *8  BC 
  
Number of commodities per farm  3.3 D 3.7  D 3.4  D 4.6  ABC  
Number of farms raising: 
   Corn  32  38  39  *48 
   Hay  *32  35  *29  *24 
   Cotton  *28  14  22  *22 
   Soybeans  44 B 65  A 60  62 
   Peanuts  *13  9  10  *11 
   Cattle  *34  26  *24  *21 
  
Household income/farm family (dollars) 104,771  133,394  *111,662  139,934 
   Farm income/farm family  65,990 BD 104,674  A *78,265  109,740  A 
   Off-farm income/farm family  38,781 B 28,720  A *32,397  30,193 
  
Average value in dollars per farm: 
   Farm assets  927,587 1,208,370  1,201,051  1,574,797 
   Farm debt  *88,030  77,606 D 91,900 138,104  B 
   Farm business net worth  839,556 1,130,764  1,109,151  1,436,693 
Business debt/asset ratio  *9  6  8  9 
1 Tobacco quotas and price supports ended after 2004 when the tobacco buyout program began.  Table includes all farms raising tobacco 
in the traditional flue-cured tobacco production region. Most of these farms raise only flue-cured tobacco, but some may also raise dark 
or burley tobacco.
 
2 An imputed wage rate is used to value unpaid labor hours. 
Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate)x100.  * indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.   a indicates 
that CV is above 50. Letters A, B, C, and D indicate significant column differences based on t-statistics at a 90-percent confidence level or higher. 
Source:  2004–07 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey.   
 
 